Identity authentication is a main line of defense for network security, and passwords have long been the mainstream of identity authentication. In the field of password security research, largescale password datasets have played an important role in the efficiency evaluation of password attack algorithms, the feasibility detection of password strength meters, and the correction of password probability models. However, due to user privacy, timeliness, effectiveness and other factors, it is still very difficult for researchers to obtain real large-scale user plaintext passwords. Based on this, this paper proposes a fast simulative password set generation algorithm based on structure partitioning and string recombination, denoted as SPSR-FSPG. The algorithm uses the probability context-free grammar to model the structure of the password, and constructs a string generation model based on the recurrent neural network to generate different types of strings, so as to learn the character composition of the password in the original dataset. In addition, the model fully considers the user's password reuse and modification behavior. Finally, the method is verified by experiment on six real Chinese and English password sets. The results show that the generation rate of SPSR-FSPG is faster than other algorithms. In terms of true password coverage, the SPSR-FPSG simulative password set is increased by 11.36% and 17.5, respectively, relative to SPPG and PCFG, and is increased by about 122. 73% and 130.3%, respectively, And the fit of the Zipf distribution is maintained at a level above 0.95, it is better than 0.9 of SPPG. At the same time, the SPPR-FPSG simulative password set is closer to the real password set in terms of length and character composition.
I. INTRODUCTION
Password has become one of the most popular user authentication methods [1] - [3] . It is easy to deploy, but also accompanied by serious security threats [4] . In password security research, large-scale real password datasets are frequently used to mine the habit of constructing passwords [5] , [6] ,
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Sohail Jabbar . test the efficiency of password attacking algorithms [7] , [8] , evaluate the rationality of password strength meters [9] , [10] , detect defects in the password protection mechanism of existing websites [11] and so on. Therefore, a reasonable and realistic password dataset has become a key research material in password security research. At present, the academic community mainly uses the following three ways to collect password datasets: directly use publicly available largescale leaked passwords [5] - [13] , through questionnaires or VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ enterprise cooperation [14] - [19] , website share user password for research [20] . However, passwords obtained by these methods are either limited in scale or have other serious defects due to pollution during the propagation process. The following three defects are summarized in the literature [21] : (1) Leaked passwords are poor in quality. This can result in deviations, and even inconsistent conclusions. For example, the literature [22] indicates that the Tianya and 7K7K password sets contain a large number of abnormal identical entries, which will cause serious deviations in the research. In addition, it is not clear if there are other sources of pollution.
(2) Leaked passwords are poor in timeliness. Over time, many systems adopt a one-way encryption mechanism to protect stored passwords, making it increasingly difficult for researchers to obtain plaintext passwords through password leakage. This led to many password security studies using datasets leaked before 2012 [5] - [13] .
(3) The sources of leaked passwords are restricted. So far, leaked large-scale password sets are usually from forumtype website [23] . Users don't pay enough attention to these websites, so there are many vulnerable behaviors (password reuse, the length is too short, composed of only a single character type, etc.), which makes the research results not directly affect the security protection of highly sensitive systems such as online banking and enterprise information systems.
Obviously, it is still very difficult for researchers to acquire large-scale password sets, but both real password sets and high-quality simulative password sets are important for generating password dictionary or evaluating the efficiency of guessing algorithms and the validity of the password strength metres. As a strategy based on data level, the construction of virtual samples solves the problem of unbalanced samples in machine learning and becomes a mainstream method [23] - [28] . In this paper, we transfer the idea of virtual sample to password research, using the existing passwords as a small sample to generate a simulative password set that can reflect the user preference. Since the small sample of user passwords is relatively controllable, the quality of large-scale simulative sets, types and timeliness of user passwords can be effectively guaranteed.
In the problem of generating the simulative password set, the prior knowledge is the construction rule of the user password found in the existing password research. This law is mainly reflected in the password structure level and the character level [12] . The real password datasets obtained by the researcher through the trusted path is used as the initial sample to generate the simulative sample. In 2017, Han et al. [21] proposed a Sample Perturbation Based Password Generation (SPPG) algorithm. They compared the generated simulative samples of different scales with the original password dataset. The indicators showed that the generated simulative samples can fully reflect the user's password construction habits and have high authenticity. However, they only simulate the passwords in the training set from the structural level, ignoring the connection at the character level. This paper first constructs a string generation algorithm based on the recurrent neural network to learn the character composition of the sample password, and further increases the string generation rate, which is recorded as SP-RNN. Then, we merge the PCFG algorithm with SP-RNN, and propose a Structure Partition and String Reorganization Based Fast Simulative Password Generation model, denoted as: SPSR-FSPG, achieving better simulative password generation performance.
In this work, we make the following key contributions:
1) A string generation algorithm, SP-RNN. By means of the powerful generalization ability and generation rate of the recurrent neural network in character generation, we first serialize the password in the training set, and then train the recurrent neural network. In the string generation stage, the length of the string is limited and the minimum probability threshold is set to ensure that the generated string is more consistent with the user's habits. The SP-RNN algorithm not only improves the generalization ability of the model, but also greatly increases the string generation rate. 2) An efficient fast simulative password set generation model, SPSR-FSPG. The model consists of three main modules: Password copy module, Feature extraction module, Password modification module. Among them, Password copy module and Password modification module characterize user password reuse and modification behavior. In the Feature extraction module, the PCFG algorithm and the SP-RNN algorithm are merged to more accurately and deeply explore the characteristics of the password set in the original password set, and further improve the generation rate of the simulative password set. 3) An extensive evaluation. We perform a series of experiments to demonstrate the performance of our module. Our experimental results show that our model is much better than the traditional password attacking algorithms PCFG, Markov and OMEN, both the password generation speed and the ability to restore the original password set. Compared with similar algorithms SPPG, our model also has advantages in various indicators.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the related works are presented. Section III describes our model as a whole. Section IV introduces the feature extraction module in detail. Section V show the password modification module. In Section VI, we conduct a large-scale experiment to evaluate the performance of the SPSR-FSPG model. Section VII summarizes the work of this paper and puts forward several potential improvement directions.
II. RELATED WORKS
In 2005, Narayanan and Shmatikov [7] first migrated the Markov chain from natural language processing to the password model. The basic assumption of the Markov chain-based password model is that when humans construct passwords, the choice of adjacent characters is not independent, but follows certain rules (for example, the string password followed by d may be larger than f). In the n-order Markov chain model, the probability of the next character appearing is based on the string of n-1 long before it. Therefore, for a given string c 1 , . . . , c m , the n-order Markov model calculates its probability as follows:
Among them, the initial probability P(c 1 , · · · , c n ) and the transition probability P(c i+1 |c i−n+1 , · · · , c i ) are statistically obtained during the training phase, taking the first-order Markov chain model as an example:
where count(c i−1 ·) is the number of arbitrary characters followed by c i−1 in the training set. When the order is greater than 1, before the training, n start characters are inserted before each password. In the passwords generation phase, the formula 1 is iterated to obtain the probability of each password string, and the guess dictionary is generated in order of decreasing probability. In 2009, Weir et al. [8] proposed Probabilistic Context-Free Grammar (PCFG) based on password structure, using a probabilistic model to model the password structure, exploring the structure of the password from a large-scale training set, and improving guessing success rate. In the training phase, PCFG divides the password into letter (L), digit (D), and special character (S) by character type, and assumes that different types of segments are independent of each other. For example, in the training phase zhang123# will be divided into L 5 D 3 S 1 , L 5 D 3 S 1 is defined as the basic structure of the password, and the string of the same type and length is concatenated, such as L 5 : Zhang, D 3 : 123, S 1 : #. In the password generation phase, the basic structure is matched by searching the set of strings, thereby generating a candidate password, and the candidate passwords are sorted in descending order of probability to obtain a guess dictionary. For example, the probability of the password zhang123# is expressed as:
The steps of PCFG to generate a guess dictionary are shown in Figure 1 .
In recent years, with the rapid development of neural network technology, password attacking models based on neural network have been continuously proposed. Powerful learning ability and learning speed of the neural network have brought a new breakthrough to the password security research area. It can automatically extract the characteristics of the password in the dataset to generate a guessing dictionary, which has strong generalization ability. In 2016, William et al. [29] proposed a model of password attacking using recurrent neural network (RNN). Compared with the traditional probability model, their method can generate more passwords in a shorter time, and have greater generalization capabilities. In 2017, Hitaj et al. [30] proposed PassGAN, a model for password attacking using deep learning. It uses Generative Adversarial Nets (GAN) to automatically extract the attribute characteristics of passwords in the training set and generate high-quality guessing sets.
In 2017, Han et al. [21] proposed SPPG algorithm to generate passwords in the simulative dictionary using the PCFG model. However, they only simulate the passwords in the training set from the structural level, ignoring the connection at the character level. In this paper, we fully consider the structure and character composition of the password, and construct a string generation algorithm based on the recurrent neural network to learn the character composition of the sample password, and further increases the string generation rate, which is recorded as SP-RNN. Then, we merge the PCFG algorithm with SP-RNN, and propose a Structure Partition and String Reorganization Based Fast Simulative Password Generation, denoted as: SPSR-FSPG. 
III. SPSR-FSPG MODEL A. MODEL OVERVIEW
The simulative samples are the expansion of the original samples on the basis of retaining the characteristics of original samples, which can support the subsequent experiments. In the research on user password habits in literature [3] , the user can be divided into three cases according to the degree of similarity with the existing password when setting a new password: using an existing password, setting a similar password, and setting a brand new password. Based on this, we use the hybrid model of PCFG and BiLSTM Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) to mine the features of structure and character in the original sample, then use the perturbationbased sample generation idea in machine learning to simulate the user's password habits, proposing a fast password set generation model based on structure partition and RNN, recorded as SPSR-FSPG.
Our model is divided into three mainly modules: password copy module, Feature extraction module, password modification module. The basic functions of the three modules are as follow:
(1) Password copy module. Generate a password identical to the password in the original sample and add it to the simulation sample.
(2) Feature extraction module. In this module, the original sample is used as the training set, then we use the PCFG algorithm to divide the passwords structure to extract the structural features of the passwords in the sample. Then, for the string of letter segment and digit segment, we use the RNN to recombine the original strings to generate new strings. The new strings not only have the characteristics of the original sample, but also further extend the strings based on this feature. Finally, the password is generated randomly with the extracted basic structure and the expanded strings, adding the generated password to the simulation sample and send it to the next module.
(3) Password modification module. In this module, we modify the passwords generated in the feature extraction module by using seven predefined password modification rules, adding the modified passwords to the simulative sample.
The SPRNN-SPPG model is shown in Figure 2 .
B. ALGORITHM FLOW
As shown in Algorithm 1, the correspondence between the SPSR-FSPG algorithm and the three submodules is as follows: (1) Steps 1∼4. M represents the number of passwords in the initial sample, N for simulative samples, X means to generate x simulative passwords for each password in the initial sample. Among them, the identical passwords account for one tenth of the total number of simulative passwords. The rest of the passwords consist of simulative passwords that are similar to the sample password or have the same structure.
(2) Steps 5∼9. Generating the password password_1 exactly the same as the sampled password, then add it to the simulative password set SimsampleSet.
(3) Steps 10∼18. Using the PCFG algorithm to train the initial sample InisampleSet, the basic structure set BaseStructSet and the string set StringSet corresponding to each segment are obtained. Then the StringSet is used as the training set of the SR-RNN algorithm (Algorithm 2) to reorganize the string, generating a new string set M-StrintSet.
(4) Steps 19∼33. For each basic structure BaseStruct in the basic structure set BaseStructSet, using the string in the M-StrintSet to randomly generate candidate passwords with the same structure and calculate their probabilities. With 1 N as the threshold, if the probability of the new passwords are higher than it, adding them to the simulative sample. Otherwise, modify them with the Modification algorithm (Algorithm 3) and add them to the simulative sample.
(5) Steps 34∼40. Considering that the simulative passwords generated in steps 5∼33 are an integer multiple of the sample set, but not necessarily equal to N. Therefore, the remaining small part of the simulative passwords Sim-sampleSet2 need to be generated again through steps 5∼33. The sample password InisampleSet2 as the training set is randomly sampled from the initial sample InisampleSet, and the number of passwords in InisampleSet2 is M 2 = N 2 X . Finally, merge the two simulative password sets.
IV. FEATURE EXTRACTION MODULE
In the feature extraction module, we use PCFG to divide the password structure in the sample, dividing the password string into letter segments (L), digit segments (D), and special character segments (S) to learn their structural features. In addition, we propose a RNN-based String Recombination algorithm (SR-RNN), using the recurrent neural network generator to reorganize the string in the letters and numbers to further learn the character characteristics of the password in the sample.
The RNN Generator generates password strings containing two phases of training and string generation. In the training phase, we set two basic premises: (1) Each len long string p 1 p 2 · · · p len can be represented as a sequence x(1) = p 1 , x(2) = p 2 , · · · , x(len) = p len ; (2) x(t)(2 ≤ t ≤ len) is related to the prefix x(1), x(2), · · · , x(t − 1) of the string sequence. In the string generation stage, first traverses the next character set Next_character predicted by the network, and then compare with the preset probability threshold to decide whether to add the new string to the character table BiString_Set. A flow chart for string generation based on BiLSTM RNN is shown in Figure 3 .
A. TRAINING PHASE
Train the neural network with L segment and D segment of different lengths as training sets, and obtain the true probability distribution and the first character probability distribution of each character. By counting the set of strings of a certain length, we can get the probability of each character as the starting character, stored by the lookup table First_character, and as the initial value of the current string Current_character. Then, input the string in Cur-rent_character into the neural network generator to get the predicted next character set Next_characte. For example, given a string of length len, it is preprocessed to represent the sequence x (1) = L(p 1 ), · · · , x (len) = L(p len ), x (len+1) = L(ED), where ED is the end identifier of the string. The supervised learning label is a sequence, that can be represented as y (1) = x (2) , y (2) = x (3) , · · · , y (len) = x (len+1) . At each time step t(1 ≤ t ≤ len), the BiLSTM layer extracts the characteristics of the input sequence, and the mth BiLSTM layer outputs h and calculates the probability distribution. Then, the error is calculated by comparison with the supervisory label. For each trained string, the loss function of the softmax regression is as follows:
where 1{·} represents the indicative function, θ represents the parameters of the softmax layer, δ represents the parameters of the BiLSTM layer, and parameters θ and δ are adjusted by BPTT. |C| indicates the number of characters in the string set C.
B. STRING GENERATION PHASE
In order to guarantee the validity of the generated string, we set a minimum probability threshold Min_probability.
All strings with a probability less than Min_probability are treated as implicit strings and discarded. Based on this, first filter the first_probability and eliminate the characters with probability less than Min_probability. Then, traverse the next characters predicted by the neural network, if the output is the end character ED and the final string length is equal to n, the string is added to the sequence table BiString_Set. Otherwise, splice the output characters to the end of the current string for the next iteration until the probability is less than the threshold Min_probability or the length is greater than n. Finally, get the string set BiString_Set of length n. The string reorganization algorithm based on BiLSTM Recurrent Neural Network (SR-RNN) is shown in Algorithm 2.
V. PASSWORD MODIFICATION MODULE
Due to the limited memory capacity of the human brain, in order to better remember the password, people usually choose to modify the existing password to construct a new password [31] . In order to simulate the user's password construction behavior, in the password modification module, we modify the password generated by the feature extraction module to obtain a password set similar to the sample password. Some studies have investigated some of the popular transformation rules for existing passwords [31] - [33] . Different studies may give inconsistent conclusions about the specific use of these rules because of the size of the survey and the differences in target populations. But in general, the frequency of these transformation rules is basically similar. In the actual user password settings, the password transformation rules are too numerous to enumerate. In this paper, we have selected the most widely used 7 types of password transformation rules. As follows: 
Deletion:
Deleting a type of character whose number accounts for a small part of the password. The password commonly contains two or more character types. For example, password123 can be transformed to get password.
2. Capitalization/Lower: This is one of the most common password modification rule that generally corresponds to the first letter transformation of the password. But it may also have the case that change the entire letter segment (if the letter segment is all lower case, it will be converted to full capitalization. Otherwise, all of them are converted to lowercase).
3. Leet: This rule is mainly to replace certain characters with other similar-looking ones. We combine the previous studies to choose the 6 most popular leet rule are: a↔@, s↔ $, o↔ 0, i↔ 1, e↔ 3, t↔7. For instance, the password is changed to p@$$w0rd. 4 . Substring: If there is a substring of a special character in the password, the substring is used as a separator, swapping the strings on both sides of it. For passwords consisting of numbers and letters, simply swap the digits and letters. For example, qwer1234 can be transformed to get 1234qw and zhang@@110 can be transformed to get 110@@zhang. 5 . Reverse: The reverse transformation usually occurs in the passwords that are shorter and contain fewer types of characters to facilitate memory. For example, abc123 can be transformed to get 321cba. 6 . Double: The short passwords are copied and then spliced behind itself to make the new password have the characteristics of palindrome, which is easy to remember and looks safe. Users are accustomed to using this method. For instance, pass can be transformed to get passpass. 7 . Halving: If the passwords have palindrome or repeat feature, taking half of the password as a similar password. For instance, from sample password love-love to similar password love.
Algorithm 3 shows the specific flow of the similar password generation method Modification based on the transformation rule. Wherein, step 1-2 indicate that if the current password cannot be expanded according to a randomly selected transformation rule, the rule is re-randomly selected; step 3 indicates that a modification rule is randomly selected for the password P 1 ; and step 4-17 indicate that the P 1 is modified according to the selected rule to obtain a similar password P 2 .
VI. EVALUATING SPSR-FPSG PERFORMANCE
In this section, we evaluate our algorithm from the generation speed and the authenticity of the simulative password. It is compared horizontally with the traditional password attack algorithms PCFG, 4-Markov, OMEN and SPPG. For the Markov chain model, we choose the 4-order Markov chain that performs optimally in the password attacking experiment.
Specifically, we use the following three indicators to analyze the quality of the simulative password set, namely:
(1) Password coverage rate. That is, the proportion of passwords belonging to the training set in the simulative password set. This indicator directly reflects the ability of the password model to restore the original password set.
(2) Zipf distribution goodness of fit. In 2014, Wang et al. [35] pointed out that the low-frequency passwords naturally cannot reflect their true frequencies according to the law of large numbers. Therefore, it only makes sense to enter those high-frequency passwords (passwords with a frequency of at least 4) into the Zipf model. And, they proved that the Zipf model is a good way to portray password distribution:
where r is the rank, f r is the frequency of the password ranked r, and C and S are constants, determined by the specific distribution. We use the coefficient of determination R 2 to measure the degree of fit. R 2 characterizes how many percentages of the variation of the dependent variable can be explained by the independent variable, which is calculated as:
where SS res is the sum of squared residuals, SS tot is the sum of squares, y i is the observed value of the dependent variable, y i is the value fitted to the regression equation, and y is the average of the observed value. The range of R 2 is [0,1], and the closer R 2 is to 1, the higher the degree of interpretation of the dependent variable by the independent variable, and the higher the reference value of the correlation equation.
(3) Password structure distribution. Decomposing the password string, we can find that the structure contained in the password in different password sets also presents certain statistical characteristics [5] .
This paper selects two basic password structure features for analysis: password length distribution and character composition distribution. The character composition of the password reflects the password policy of the website on the one hand, and directly reflects the user's preference on the other hand. The password is usually composed of 95 printable ASII characters, including uppercase letters [A∼Z], lowercase letters [a∼z], digits [0∼9], and special characters, where SC indicates all special characters that can be used in the password. In this article, we set up 10 common password character combination modes, as shown in Table 4 .
In the experiment, the six original datasets are all from real websites and were widely used in various password studies by the academic community, as shown in Table 5 . The sample password is randomly extracted from the original datasets, and the sample size is one tenth of the original datasets. After training, the number of generated passwords is equal to 10 times, 100 times, and 1000 times the number of passwords in the sample (that is, 1 times, 10 times, 100 times the size of the original datasets).
A. SIMULATIVE PASSWORD GENERATION SPEED
Note that, the Markov model, the PCFG model, the OMEN algorithm, the SPPG algorithm, and the SPSR-FPSG algorithm have large differences in the speed at which the simulative password set is generated. Table 2 shows the timeconsuming comparison of five models to generate password sets of different sizes. It can be seen from the table that the rate of our model is significantly better than the traditional PCFG and Markov chain algorithms. Compared with the similar algorithm SPPG, our algorithm also has obvious advantages in speed, which benefit from the high rate of the neural network model when generating strings. In addition, our algorithm's mining depth of the original password dataset is much higher than SPPG, and the cost performance is the highest. We will analyze it in the performance comparison experiment later. In the experiment, the six original datasets are all from real websites and were widely used in various password studies by the academic community, as shown in Table 4 . The sample password is randomly extracted from the original datasets, and the sample size is one tenth of the original datasets. After training, the number of generated passwords is equal to 10 times, 100 times, and 1000 times the number of passwords in the sample (that is, 1 times, 10 times, 100 times the size of the original datasets). Figure 4 shows the proportion of passwords that successfully fall into the original password sets when the five models generate the simulative password set of the same size as the original password sets. On different datasets, the coverage of the five models show the same trends. Taking the Rockyou dataset as an example, the lowest coverage rate is the 4order Markov chain model and the OMEN algorithm, which respectively are 0.22 and 0.23. Followed by SPPG algorithm and PCFG algorithm, respectively 0.42 and 0.38. Our algorithm has the highest coverage rate of 0.49. According to the average results of the five datasets, the SPSR-FPSG simulative password set is about 15.36% higher than SPPG, about 122.73% higher than OMEN and 4-order Markov, and about 24.5% higher than PCFG. In summary, the simulative password sets generated by the SPSR-FPSG algorithm have the highest coverage.
B. PASSWORD COVERAGE

C. FITTING DEGREE OF ZIPF DISTRIBUTION
We calculate the Zipf fit of different scales of simulative password sets generated by five models according to Equation 6.1, and use the histogram to show the comparison results, as shown in Figure 5 . It can be seen from Figure 5 that the decision coefficients of the simulative password set generated by the 4-Markov model, the OMEN model and the SPSR-FSPG model are all stable above 0.95, no matter which website the sample comes from, and the SPSR-FSPG model is better than the other two models. The decision coefficient of the SPPG model is maintained at around 0.9.
The PCFG simulative password set has the worst performance. Each Zipf decision coefficient is lower than the other four models. Even the generated CSDN-1x and 000webhost-1x simulative password set have a coefficient of determination less than 0.7, which seriously deviates from the Zipf distribution.
D. PASSWORD STRUCTURE DISTRIBUTION
We separately calculated the distribution of the length and character composition of the five original password sets and their corresponding simulative password sets. The results show that there are differences in the distribution of password structures between different websites, especially between English websites and Chinese websites. This may be affected by website strategy, website nature, cultural differences, and user groups. Figures 6 show the distribution of password lengths in the five original password sets and their corresponding simulative password sets. As can be seen from the figure, the distribution of SPSR-FSPG simulative password set is very consistent with the original password set, SPPG simulative password set and PCFG simulative password set is very consistent with that of the original password sets, and the curves in the figure almost coincide. The peak of the curve of SPPG and PCFG simulative password set is slightly higher than the original password set. The distribution deviation of the 4-Markov and OMEN analog password sets is more obvious, and the peak value deviates toward the shorter password direction.
Taking the simulative password set of 10 times of the original password set in Figure 6 as an example for specific observation, it can be seen that in the original password set of 000webhost, the password with length 8 is the most, accounting for 22.31%. The number of passwords with length 8 in SPSR-FSPG, SPPG and PCFG simulative password set is also the most, which are 22.45%, 24.68%, 25.73%. In the OMEN and 4-Markov simulative password sets, the password with length 6 is the most, which respectively is 32.88% and 31.42%, while the proportion of passwords with length 8 is only 9.76% and 10.25%. The proportions of passwords longer than 10 in the original password library, SPSR-FSPG, SPPG, and PCFG simulative password sets are 34.64%, 33.17%, 32.41%, and 30.11%, respectively; and the proportions in the OMN and 4-Markov simulative password sets are respectively 4.65%, 5.03%.
In summary, the SPSR-FSPG simulative password set is basically consistent with the original password set in the distribution of the password length. In the SPPG and PCFG simulative password sets, the number of passwords in the area where the password length distribution is concentrated will be more than the original password sets. And the area in the 4-Markov simulative password set with the password length distribution is deviated in a shorter direction, and the long password ratio is reduced. Figures 6 show the character composition of the six original password sets and their corresponding simulative password sets. The red lines in the figure represent the character distribution of the original password set. In the Chinese dataset, the digits account for the largest proportion.
Passwords consisting only of digits account for more than 30%, and passwords containing digit account for more than 80. In English datasets, letters account for the largest proportion, and passwords consisting only of letters account for more than 35%, passwords containing letters account for more than 90%. In particular, more than 95% of passwords in 000webhost are composed of letters and digits, which is consistent with the password policy enforced by the website.
Furthermore, as can be seen from the figure, the SPSR-FSPG simulative password set distribution is basically the same as the original password set, and the mixed mode (including multiple types of characters) in the former accounts for a larger proportion than the latter. The 4-Markov and OMEN simulative password sets have more passwords consisting of pure numbers and lowercase letters than the original password set.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper constructs a fast simulative password set generation model by deeply mining the structural characteristics of passwords in the dataset, denoted as SPSR-FSPG. Our model is divided into three modules: password copy module, feature extraction module, password modification module. These three modules correspond to different password construction habits of human beings. In addition, in the feature extraction module, at the structural level, we use the PCFG algorithm to learn the structural features of the original password. At the character level, we use the recurrent neural network model to learn the character composition of passwords. Moreover, large-scale experiments were carried out on six Chinese and English datasets. The results show that compared with the traditional password generation algorithm, our model is not only faster, but also generates a similar simulative password set with the original password. Our method solves the problem that large-scale and effective real passwords are difficult to obtain, which is beneficial to password security researchers to conduct more in-depth research.
In the future work, we will continue to optimize our algorithms, and will also explore a more targeted simulation password set generation model. For example, in the era of bigdata where personal information is readily available, Wang et al. [6] have shown that using personal information to crack passwords will have a higher success rate. How to construct a simulative password set for a specific website or a specific group is a worthwhile direction.
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